USA v. William Hoffa, Jr. by unknown
2009 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-2-2009 
USA v. William Hoffa, Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. William Hoffa, Jr." (2009). 2009 Decisions. 15. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/15 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2009 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
NO. 08-3920
                    
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WILLIAM J. HOFFA, JR.
Appellant
                    
On Appeal From the United States 
District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 2-08-cr-00048-001)
District Judge:  Hon. Gustave Diamond
                   
Argued October 28, 2009
BEFORE:  SMITH, FISHER and STAPLETON,
Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed  December 2, 2009)
                    
2Lisa B. Freeland
Federal Public Defender
Karen S. Gerlach (Argued)
Assistant Federal Public Defender
1450 Liberty Center
1001 Liberty Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA  15222
  Attorneys for Appellant
Mary Beth Buchanan
United States Attorney
Robert L. Eberhardt (Argued)
Assistant U.S. Attorney
700 Grant Street - Suite 4000
Pittsburgh, PA  15219
  Attorneys for Appellee
                    
OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Appellant William J. Hoffa, Jr., pled guilty to one count
of bank robbery and one count of attempted bank robbery in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).  The District Court sentenced
him to a 115-month term of imprisonment on each count, with
3the two terms to be served concurrently.  On appeal, Hoffa
insists that the District Court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a), as
well as our decision in United States v. Manzella, 475 F.3d 152
(3d Cir. 2007), when it determined the length of his
imprisonment by taking into consideration his need of medical
treatment for end-stage liver disease.  Hoffa also contends that
the District Court erred when it applied a three-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E) for possessing or
brandishing a gun.  Because we find merit in Hoffa’s § 3582(a)
argument, we will vacate his sentence and remand for
resentencing.
I.
In Manzella, we were called upon to reconcile the
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) and the provisions of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Section 3582(a) provides:
Factors to be considered in imposing a term of
imprisonment–The court, in determining whether
to impose a term of imprisonment, and, if a term
of imprisonment is to be imposed, in determining
the length of the term, shall consider the factors
set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they
are applicable, recognizing that imprisonment is
not an appropriate means of promoting correction
and rehabilitation.
Section 3553(a) provides in relevant part:
Factors to be considered in imposing a
4sentence–The court shall impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph
(2) of this subsection.  The court, in determining
the particular sentence to be imposed, shall
consider– 
. . .
(2) the need for the sentence imposed– 
. . .
(D) to provide the defendant
with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care,
or other correctional treatment in
the most effective manner. . . .
In Manzella, we began by noting that “§§ 3553(a)(2)(D)
and 3582(a) appear to be in conflict – the former requiring a
sentencing court to consider a defendant’s need for
rehabilitation and the latter prohibiting it.”  Manzella, 475 F.3d
at 157.  We concluded, however, that “the supposed conflict is
illusory.”  Id.  We explained:
The terms “sentence” and “imprisonment”
in the Sentencing Reform Act are different – and
are the key to understanding how §§ 3582(a) and
3553(a)(2)(D) operate in harmony.  “Sentence”
has broad meaning.  It includes many types of
possible punishment, only one of which is
“imprisonment.”  See 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b)
(authorizing sentences of fines, probation,
restitution, forfeiture, and victim notice, in
5addition to imprisonment); id. § 3583 (providing
for supervised release after a term of
imprisonment).  So understood, the “conflict”
between §§ 3582(a) and 3553(a)(2)(D) wanes
away:  courts must consider a defendant’s need
for rehabilitation when devising an appropriate
sentence (pursuant to § 3553(a)(2)(D)), but may
not carry out that goal by imprisonment (pursuant
to § 3553(a)).
Id. at 158 (emphasis in original).  To illustrate the lack of
conflict, we cited as examples of the appropriate implementation
of § 3553(a) the imposition of probation or supervised release
tailored to the defendant’s rehabilitation needs, and the
recommendation of a particular facility in situations where the
defendant is to be sentenced to imprisonment for other purposes.
The sentencing court in Manzella, in explaining the
reason for the length of the 30-month sentence imposed, found
it “obvious that the short-term incarcerations and the drug
treatment programs to date have not been sufficient to help
[Manzella] work through her issues.”  Id. at 161.  It sentenced
her to thirty months because the “drug treatment program of 500
hours [was] the best program . . . available in the federal
correctional system” and a sentence of not less than 30 months
was required in order to participate in that program.  Id. at 155.
Based on this explanation, we concluded that the “Court set the
length of Manzella’s prison term solely for rehabilitative
reasons.”  Id. at 161.  While recognizing the District Court’s
“good intentions,” we found we had no alternative but to remand
     We noted that on remand the District Court might find it1
appropriate to impose a sentence that “includes prison along
with community confinement or home detention, which could be
conditioned on attendance at a drug rehabilitation program.”  Id.
at 162 n.8.
6
for resentencing.   1
As in Manzella, Hoffa’s sentencing judge acted with the
best of intentions.  He also, like the judge in Manzella, left no
doubt that his sentence violated §3582(a).  His explanation of
his sentence made it crystal clear that Hoffa’s need for medical
care was a primary reason for his imposing a sentence of
imprisonment at the high end of the Guideline range.  Early in
the sentencing hearing, the judge addressed defense counsel as
follows:
THE COURT:  Ms. Sims, you’ve made a
rather extensive and well presented case with
regard to the unfortunate circumstances that have
surrounded this defendant’s life, and you urged
the Court to sentence the defendant at the low end
or below the guidelines range.  I have to tell you
that I believe that the principal factor that the
Court should take into consideration in
determining an appropriate sentence under 18
U.S.C. 3553(a) is the section of 3553(a)(2)(D)
which indicates that the sentence should be one
that considers the defendant’s need for medical
attention.  I believe that is the overriding factor to
7be considered in this situation.  You make a
strong argument for the defendant’s need for
medical attention.  The fact that he is unable to
provide it for himself on the outside, and, in fact,
I believe that the strongest argument for a
sentence at the high end of the guidelines so as to
provide adequate medical attention for the
defendant is to be found on Page 14 of your
memorandum in mitigation in which you state:
“The circumstances of the offense are also
mitigating.  Mr. Hoffa was released from prison
after serving 20 years, with serious mental and
medical problems.  His life was a struggle for
survival.  He was beset by his inability to find
housing, his lack of basic necessities, his
consuming fear regarding his health and lack of
medical care, his struggles with drugs and
alcohol, and his difficulty to adjusting to life
outside prison.”
* * *
It seems to me that a person with Hepatitis
C, with final stage cirrhosis who cannot otherwise
find medical help and other resources to provide
him with the necessities of life at this stage
requires the services that apparently only the
government under these circumstances can
provide.
App. at 162-63 (emphasis supplied).
8Following these remarks, defense counsel called §
3582(a) and Manzella to the Court’s attention and quoted the
text of the statute.  The Court responded that it did not
understand the terms “correction and rehabilitation” in the
context of § 3582(a) to include medical care.  When counsel
expressed the understanding that “rehabilitation would cover
medical rehabilitation,” App. at 166, the Court once again
candidly acknowledged the role that medical care was playing
in its thinking:
THE COURT:  Use whatever term you
want.  If I’m wrong and if the circuit court wants
to reverse me because included in my reasons for
the sentencing of this defendant is the fact that he
needs medical attention, then I need that kind of
education.
App. at 166-67.
Finally, immediately prior to pronouncing sentence, the
District Court summarized the reasons behind it.  The principal
factors which determined the sentence were society’s need to
have Hoffa incapacitated and his need for medical care:
I believe that from the portions of the defendant’s
statement that I have read that he is unable and
has been unable to obtain adequate medical
attention on the outside.  He has a serious medical
condition, hepatitis C, and however it’s termed,
final stage cirrhosis, that needs to be treated and
those can be treated to a certain extent.  His social
9workers have indicated that treatment is not really
available on the outside on a regular basis, so I
believe that a factor that should be taken into
consideration is the defendant’s need for medical
attention and the fact that he will get medical
attention from the Bureau of Prisons.
The principal factor that the Court takes
into consideration here in addition to the medical
is the need to protect the public and to
incapacitate the defendant.  He has had adequate
opportunity by his age, 49, to comply with the law
and he has been unable or unwilling to do that,
therefore, I believe the public at this point needs
to be protected from the defendant.
App. at 180-81.
Based on the District Court’s forthright explanation of its
sentence, there can be no conclusion other than that Hoffa’s
need of medical care was a principal factor in his receiving a
sentence of incarceration at the top of the Guideline range.
Given that conclusion and our decision in Manzella, we have no
choice but to find a violation of § 3582(a) and remand for
resentencing.  We do so reluctantly because we are confident
that the District Court believed it was acting in Hoffa’s best
interests.  Hoffa is entitled to take issue with this view, however.
The government does not contend that medical care is not
     This is, of course, understandable.  As we have indicated,2
Manzella held that treatment for drug addiction was
rehabilitation within the meaning of § 3582(a).  Given the lack
of a material distinction between treatment for drug addiction
and treatment for liver disease, Manzella governs here.
In the course of concluding that treatment for drug
addiction was rehabilitation, the Manzella Court looked for
guidance to 28 U.S.C. § 994(k).  Like § 3582(a), that section
was adopted as part of the Sentencing Reform Act.  See Pub. L.
98-473, Title II, ch. II, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).  It
provides:
(k) The Commission shall insure that the
guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of
imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for
the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or
providing the defendant with needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment.
Given “the sections’ common origin and remarkably similar
wording,” the Manzella Court found § 994(k) “to be instructive
to [its] understanding of § 3582(a).”  Id. at 158 n.2.  It
understandably concluded that the concern which motivated
Congress’ § 3582(a) instruction to the courts was coextensive
with the concern that motivated its § 994(k) instruction to the
Sentencing Commission.  In United States v. Watson, 482 F.3d
10
rehabilitation within the meaning of § 3582(a).   Its position is2
269 (3d Cir. 2007), we applied § 3582(a) in the context of a
defendant with AIDS and a resulting need of medical care.
11
rather that § 3582(a) was violated in Manzella only because the
Court set the length of Manzella’s prison term “solely for
rehabilitative reasons.”  Appellee’s Br. at 18 (quoting from
Manzella, 475 F.3d at 161).  The government correctly quotes
from the Court’s summary of its holding and correctly points out
that the need for medical care was not the sole determinating
factor here.  However, its conclusion that Hoffa’s sentence does
not violate § 3582(a) is flawed.
The Manzella Court phrased the summary of its holding
as it did because rehabilitative reasons were the sole determining
factor there.  It held as it did, however, because § 3582(a)
dictates that “imprisonment is not an appropriate means of
promoting  . . . rehabilitation.”  It follows that rehabilitation
cannot be used to justify imprisonment or imprisonment for a
particular period of time.  As we explained in Manzella,
Congress intended a scheme in which “incarceration would have
to be justified by such traditional penological purposes as
incapacitation, general deterrence, specific deterrence, and
retribution.”  Manzella, 475 F.3d at 158 (quoting from United
States v. Maier, 975 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1992)).  Section 3582(a)
simply cannot be fairly read to sanction prison terms like
Hoffa’s which are justified in part by rehabilitation and in part
by traditional penological purposes.
This is not to say, of course, that where an imprisonment
and its length are justified by such traditional penological
12
purposes the sentencing judge may not anticipate and approve
the defendant’s participation in a rehabilitation program.
Indeed, as we indicate in Manzella, the sentencing judge is free
to recommend that such a program be made available.
Consistent with § 3582(a), however, a sentencing court may not
impose a sentence of imprisonment for a period of time it would
not impose in the absence of a rehabilitation program.
Given the Court’s perception of the need to incapacitate
Hoffa, one can safely predict that a sentence of imprisonment
would have been imposed in his case even in the absence of a
need for medical care.  One cannot safely predict, however, the
length of the imprisonment that would have been imposed
absent that need.  While it is conceivable that at Hoffa’s
resentencing, the District Court may conclude that a sentence of
115 months is required by the need to incapacitate him, his need
of medical care clearly played a role in the fashioning of the
current sentence.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Hoffa has
carried his burden of demonstrating that his sentence violated §
3582(a), United States v. Watson, 482 F.3d 269, 275 (3d Cir.
2007), and we will, accordingly, remand for resentencing.
II.
In calculating the appropriate Guideline range, the
District Court applied a three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.
2B3.1(b)(2)(E).  Hoffa contends that it did so without
evidentiary support.
     The 2007 edition of the Guidelines Manual was used by the3
District Court.
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U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A)-(F) provides:
(A) If a firearm was discharged, increase by 7
levels; (B) if a firearm was otherwise used,
increase by 6 levels; (C) if a firearm was
brandished or possessed, increase by 5 levels; (D)
if a dangerous weapon was otherwise used,
increase by 4 levels; (E) if a dangerous weapon
was brandished or possessed, increase by 3 levels;
or (F) if a threat of death was made, increase by 2
levels.
Application Note 2 to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 provides:3
2.  Consistent with Application Note 1(d)(ii) of §
1B1.1 (Application Instructions), an object shall
be considered to be a dangerous weapon for
purposes of subsection (b)(2)(E) if (A) the object
closely resembles an instrument capable of
inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or (B) the
defendant used the object in a manner that
created the impression that the object was an
instrument capable of inflicting death or serious
bodily injury (e.g., a defendant wrapped a hand in
a towel during a bank robbery to create the
appearance of a gun).
14
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1, cmt. n.2 (2007) (emphasis supplied).
During his change of plea proceedings, Hoffa admitted
(1) that he robbed the Parkvale Bank in Uniontown,
Pennsylvania, on December 24, 2007; (2) that he “kept his hand
in [his] pocket to indicate he had a weapon;” and (3) that he told
the teller, “If I pull it out, I’ll use it.’”  App. at 66, 69.  The teller
told the investigating officers that she believed the suspect had
a gun in his pocket.
The District Court made the following findings:
[T]he evidence demonstrates that defendant did
not “merely” have his hand in his pocket, but that
he used it to create the appearance that he was
carrying a firearm.  The criminal complaint
affidavit states that the CS told agents that
defendant had indicated that he had used his
finger to suggest that he had a firearm.  In
addition, an FBI document summarizing
defendant’s interview indicates that defendant
told FBI agents that “[h]e had kept his hand in his
pocket to indicate that he had a weapon.”  Along
with his statement that “if I have to pull it out, I’ll
use it”, defendant’s act of placing his hand in his
pocket clearly was intended to create the
impression that he was armed.  Accordingly, the
three-level increase under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E) is
warranted in this case.
App. at 4.
15
Hoffa insists that only a two-level enhancement was
appropriate because he did nothing other than threaten the teller.
The District Court found, however, that he purposefully
conveyed the impression that he possessed a gun and that
finding is not clearly erroneous.  A three-level enhancement was
accordingly appropriate.  United States v. Dixon, 982 F.2d 116
(3d Cir. 1992).
III.
The sentence of the District Court will be vacated, and
this matter will be remanded to the District Court for
resentencing.
